This article discusses three measures proposed for evaluating the fairness and convenience of legislative redistricting plans: (1) Geographic compactness, (2) population compactness, and (3) a new population density fairness measure. There are over a dozen proposed competing measures of geographic compactness. Pictorial counterexamples demonstrate how most of these measures are unreliable. The isoperimetric quotient is recommended for measuring area compactness because it has a maximum value of one (1) when the district is as compact as a circle, a minimum value approaching zero, and enables direct comparison of any two districts' compactness regardless of size. On the other hand, population compactness helps to ensure districts are convenient for voters and politicians. Population compactness can be measured using the distance of a district's census blocks, weighted by its proportion of the district's population to the district's population centroid. However, due to population distribution patterns, neither area nor population compactness guarantee proportionally fair representation.
Background
Legislative districts in the United States are redrawn following every decennial census. The process of reapportionment involves complex issues. The constitution requires districts having roughly equal population. Administrative practicalities demand respect for political and geographic boundaries.
All legislative districts in the U.S. smaller than entire states will be redrawn on the basis of the 2010 census. Politicians are prone to use redistricting to concentrate voters of opposing parties in strangely shaped districts so there will be more districts in which their party's voters are a safe, but smaller majority. Or politicians may reward or punish legislators by creating safe districts or by moving a representative's supporters out of his district. Safe districts, it has been plausibly argued tend to be be compact it is considered more difficult to achieve these ends. Population compactness of districts also reduce travel time of legislators within their districts and, if existing political boundaries are taken into consideration, increase the shared interests of constituents in each district and presumably provide for legislative representation more attuned to voters' concerns. However, as is shown in this paper, compactness does not ensure fair proportional representation for urban and rural dwellers.
Thirty-five states require legislative districts be compact, believed to make gerrymanderingdesigning legislative districts so as to advantage one political party -more difficult. Area compactness is readily distinguished by the human eye.
i Dictionary definitions for compact include "arranged within a relatively small space" and "designed to be economical in operation". UNDER CONSTRUCTION -more introductory text regarding population compactness, mathematical analysis of proportionate partisan fairness of redistricting plans, and proposed measures of population density variance for redistricting purposes is needed here. MacEachren (1985) provides a summary of eleven proposed measures of shape compactness and concludes, "indices based on dispersion of elements of area will provide the most accurate measures of compactness due to their consideration of the unit as a whole." iii However MacEachren's sample consisted of shapes of US counties rather than gerrymandered districts. MacEachren's index, devised to measure a shape's compactness, assumed that the distribution of characteristics within geographic areas varies at a constant linear rate of change and that compactness should thus be measured as the standard deviation of randomly assigned distribution of values that change at a constant rate spread out over 1/10 th area square units. However, the shapes of gerrymandered legislative districts under the preclearance clause of the Voting Rights Act, and ethnic and economic settlement patterns vary sharply at a road or river boundary suggesting the assumption of constant rate of change in constituent characteristics do not hold. In addition, measuring compactness in terms of dispersion of area from a shape's centroid assigns equal numerical value to shapes having widely differing visual compactness. It would be more difficult to administer and serve constituents in districts drawn using "compactness" measures that assign the same value to geographically disparate districts, as shown in example six below. iv The Blair & Biss method that MacEachren touts is numerically not well-defined in cases of extremely gerrymandered shapes and is difficult to calculate.
I. Geographic Compactness
Prior articles evaluating various measures of compactness have performed inter-measure comparisons, comparing various proposed measures of compactness with one other for the same shapes. This article takes a different approach, performing a comparison of each measure with itself on different shapes. To be internally consistent, a measure of compactness will not assign an equal numerical value of compactness to two shapes having obviously unequal compactness, especially to two districts having the same area. For ten of the proposed measures of compactness, I show counterexamples to reliability by showing two different geographic shapes having clearly different compactness that are assigned the exact same measure of compactness.
A. Measures That Fail To Reliably Measure Geographic Compactness
The following counterexamples show how nine measures that allege to measure two-dimensional geographic compactness assign the same measurement to shapes that differ in compactness and are therefore not effective, reliable measures of geographic compactness.
[NOTE:
The following drawings need to be redone for clarity and precision.]
1. The diameter of the largest inscribing circle divided by the diameter of the smallest circumscribing circle (Haggett 1966) . A counterexample shows equal inscribing and circumscribing circles, so equal ratios of diameters of those circles, but districts differing in compactness. Warren Smith aptly expressed the flaws of this method,
The underlying problem is this measure does not care if a district has a really jagged wiggly boundary. For example, a perfect circle, and a circle with very wiggly microscopic structure of the boundary (but still looks like a circle viewed with imperfect vision) have almost exactly the same 'quality.' In fact the wiggly circle has 'better' quality than a perfect square, which is crazy. convex, yet the district shape at left is more compact. Using convexity as a measure of compactness, a city that is primarily composed of one political party's members could be cut up in a pizza-pie-like redistricting plan to ensure that the city's inhabitants did not have proportional representation. Such a gerrymandered plan would have a near perfect measure of compactness using the convexity definition of compactness.
Figure 9 10. A tenth counter-example shows why simple area-to-perimeter measures, or their inverses, do not reliably measures area compactness due to their sensitivity to size variation of districts.
Minimizing the sum of district perimeter to area ratios, the visually less compact redistricting plan, below right, is measured as more compact than the visually more compact plan having two virtually square-shaped districts on the left. Notice that the "dimensionless" measure
N ∑ does not rank redistricting plans in the same order as the measure
∑ , measuring the left plan below more compact than the plan on the right. 
B. Perimeter--squared--To--Area Measures Of Geographic Compactness
To compare the relative compactness of two individual districts with different areas, the measure provides the same measure for equally compact districts, regardless of varying district size in area. Any compactness measure is "dimensionless" when the units of measurement cancel from both numerator and denominator. Thus the following measures of district area compactness give a pure dimensionless number:
. All dimensionless measures of compactness allow direct comparison of compactness between two shapes having different sizes.
Some proposed compactness measures involving ratios of powers of areas and perimeters are equivalent. For instance, minimizing district perimeter to area ratios is equivalent to maximizing district area to perimeter; multiplying any constant times any ratio of powers of perimeter to area or area to perimeter does not affect the order of how two redistricting plans are ranked. Thus, the measures proposed by several scholars, including Stuart S. Nagel, Tony L. Hill, and Joseph E.
Schwartzberg, Daniel D. Polsby, Robert D. Popper, and Avencia, would seem to rank the geometric compactness of any set of competing redistricting plans in the same order.
C. Which Geographic Compactness Measure is Best? The Isoperimetric Quotient
It is a mathematical theorem, called the isoperimetric inequality, that among all twodimensional regions having a given area, the one with the smallest perimeter is a circle (or equivalently, among all regions with a given perimeter, the circle has the largest area). This result has been known since antiquity, though the first rigorous proof by modern standards is less than 200 years old. More technically: if a closed curve has perimeter P and enclosed area is A, it follows that ! A i P i ©2011 Kathy Dopp; posted at http://ssrn.com 11/30/11
Moreover, the two sides are equal if and only if the curve is a circle. One can easily check that equality holds for a circle of radius R (whose area is πR 2 and whose circumference is 2πR). For a given closed curve the isoperimetric quotient Q is defined as the ratio of its area to the area of a circle having the same perimeter:
and the isoperimetric inequality says that Q ≤ 1 with Q = 1 if the shape is a circle.
Our intuitive sense of area compactness means having a relatively large area for a given perimeter. But one must divide the area by the square of the perimeter (A/L 2 ), not by the perimeter itself, to get a measure that depends only on the shape and not on the absolute size of a region or on the units of measurement (feet, inches meters, etc.) 3 While it might seem simpler to define compactness as A/L 2 , without the factor of 4π, introducing this factor gives the index more intuitive content because one is directly comparing the compactness of a given figure to that of a circle (for which Q = 1). Some have called the isoperimetric quotient after the names of other scholars who have recommended its usage for measuring compactness of legislative districts. For instance, the developers of the redistricting software available on http://publicmapping.org call this compactness measure the PolsbyPopper and Schwartzberg method. 3 Some readers might pause to calculate the ratio A/L (not the square of L) for a square whose side is 1, whose perimeter is therefore 4 and whose area is numerically 1 and then for another rectangle whose side is 12, whose perimeter is 48, and whose area is 144. and whose area. The second rectangle can also be viewed as the first rectangle measured in inches as opposed to feet. "Although it has no effect on the optimization, plan--measures that do some kind of average are better than those that simply sum, because the compactness of the whole plan can be discussed on the same scale as the compactness of an individual district, eliminating much confusion." 5 Thus, the best measure for comparing redistricting plan compactness is to maximize the quantity
Due to differences in overall compactness of different states' shapes, the compactness of two different states' plans must be compared by multiplying by the ratios of their overall compactness.
D. A Counter--Example to the Isoperimetric Quotient?
Assume the two shapes below have the exact same isoperimetric quotient, A redistricting plan having many districts must be considered as a whole by considering the sum or average compactness of all the districts in a state. Conformance to the Voting Rights Act preclearance provisions, geographical boundaries such as mountain ranges, rivers, highways, and to jurisdictional boundaries such as cities, counties, and towns, as well as adjustment to various population distributions come into play. Thus, the isoperimetric quotient measurement of compactness constrains gerrymandering regardless of the fact that sometimes district shapes having the same measure of compactness may fit within different-sized circumscribed circles or be more or less convex.
Rotating any phalanges centered on a symmetrical center to be closer together (thus, enabling the overall shape to exist within a smaller circumscribing circle) does not change the overall distances between all points, if travel is constrained within the district. A representative driving within the district to visit all its voters would have the same driving distances overall between points within the district and could not locate a constituent office within the district to be closer overall to more points within the district in either shaped district.
If we were to define a district fitting within a smaller circumscribed circle as more compact than a district fitting within a larger circumscribed circle, then compactness would be a measure of smallness. This would mean that smaller circles would be more compact than larger circles, removing the ability to use our compactness measure to directly compare shapes having unequal areas. A measure of compactness based on smallness would also lack the nice property of assigning values between 0 and 1.
Minimizing the sum of the ratios of perimeter-squared-to-area of districts in a redistricting plan (or maximizing their inverse ratios) reliable finds the most geographically compact legislative redistricting plan. Any constant times the area-to-perimeter-squared measure of compactness ranks the same set of redistricting plans for a given geographic region in exactly the same order. 
II. Population Compactness
It can be argued that population compactness is a more important feature for legislative districts than geographic compactness. To benefit voters by placing them in districts with population centers relatively close to the places where they live, Robert Enders suggests minimizing the weighted average distance of districts' population to their population centroids. The population
A j is its area, and
is the sum of the squared distances of its census block, or other area components, to its population centroid. The population centroid, or population center, of each district € j is defined as For uniformly populated regions, this measure is similar to the isoperimetric quotient in that a circular shape has the most population compactness and squares score better than rectangles. Districts that concentrate population near their centers are more compact than those that concentrate population near their edges.
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III. Disproportionate Representation, Even with Compactness
Counter-examples show that there can be disproportionate representation, even with compact districts, as measured by Democrats. Again assuming the radius of the little circle of Democrats is 1, and the radius of the smallest district in its middle is 0.5 and the radius of the big circle is three, the area compactness of this plan is
Clearly this redistricting plan is also unfair because it awards two districts to Republicans and one district to Democrats, even though Democrats outnumber Republicans. Yet, this plan ranks as the most geographically compact plan. 
IV. Population Density Fairness of Redistricting Plans
This section introduces an objective, nonpartisan population density fairness (PDF) measure that can be used to judge how closely a plan awards proportionately fair representation amongst people living in regions with various population densities.
Rural and urban dwellers often have dissimilar political interests. To achieve fair proportionate 
Proportional population density fairness requires two conditions to be met. First, the mean population density of districts should be roughly equal to the state's weighted mean population density, weighted by the relative number of people overall living in each density level in the state. If the average density of plan districts is lower than the weighted state average density of its census blocks, the districting plan would tend to disproportionately advantage less populated areas over urban ©2011 Kathy Dopp; posted at http://ssrn.com 11/30/11
areas. If the average density of plan districts is higher than the weighted state average, then the plan will tend to advantage more densely populated areas disproportionately. Thus, we mathematically, minimize
Second, the standard deviation of districts' median densities from the overall median of the districts must be roughly equal to the districts' median itself. If the variance of the district population densities from the median density is greater than the median density, the minority group will be disproportionately advantaged above their proportionate level in the population. If the variance of the district population densities is too small, the majority group will be disproportionately advantaged. For example, if the variance is too large, and the number of rural dwellers is less than the number of urban dwellers, the plan will disproportionately advantage rural voters.
Thus, mathematically, we minimize
. The reason medians, rather than means, are used in the calculations is because the median voter plus one determines the winning candidate and winning political party of plurality elections. Too-small a standard deviation of districts from the median state population density would award all legislative seats to the political party favored by a majority of voters; and, too-large a standard deviation from the overall state median population density would award legislative seats disproportionately to a political party favored by a minority of voters.
Redistricting plans meeting both of the above conditions will most fairly award legislative seats proportionately to urban and rural dwellers. Thus, a redistricting plan population density fairness (PDF) measure is:
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The PDF measure sums the absolute values of the differences between: (1) each districts' median population density and the standard deviation of its districts' population densities from its districts' median population density, and (2) a plan districts' mean population density to the state's mean population density weighted by the population proportion of its various regions. The closer this PDF measure is to zero, the proportionately fairer the plan will be with respect to representing regions with diverse population densities.
This new PDF measure has the advantage of being nonpartisan and yet responds to the fact that partisanship of districts is often correlated with district population density. Similar measures could be used to evaluate the proportional fairness of a redistricting plan with respect to how fairly it represents groups having other varying properties. In Example 3, one densely populated district and two districts with equal population density: This redistricting plan is the fairest of the three in that is awards seats proportionately most fairly to urban and rural dwellers. Notice that there is adequate variance among the three districts' population densities -closer to the median population density in this proportionately fairer plan.
The calculated PDF is
The districts' population densities are shown in the chart below: Notice the first four conditions listed above are considered to be more crucial and yet the second two conditions, compactness and administrative ease, are important for the ease and cost of serving, being served, and administering legislative districts.
Such a process for deciding on which district map to adopt might reduce the need for subjective judgments or competing claims and create districts to better serve voters, and be easier for representatives to serve and for election officials to administer.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that most formerly proposed measures of area compactness for purposes of legislative redistricting are unreliable, and that area compactness of redistricting plans can be reliably measured using the isoperimetric quotient -the ratio of the area of the district to the area of a circle having the same perimeter. It also discusses a population compactness measure of convenient proximity within districts for voters and representatives.
Redistricting plans having more compactness may be proportionately less fair than plans having less compactness. On the other hand, a new population density fairness (PDF) measure evaluates the proportional fairness of reapportionment plans in representing persons living in regions of diverse population densities. Plans with PDF values closer to zero (0) more fairly represent urban and rural dwellers in proportion to their numbers. The efficacy of the PDF measure requires empirical testing.
